Why Wouldn't They Be Reconciled? Corbyn's Leadership and the Recalcitrance of the Parliamentary Labour Party by Gilbert, J. & Gilbert, J.
Why Wouldn’t They Be Reconciled? Corbyn’s




One of the most striking features of Labour Party politics during the years of Jeremy Corbyn’s
leadershipwas the recalcitrant lack of cooperation that he received frommany LabourMPs, even
after his remarkable success in the 2017 general election. This article systematically examines a
number of possible explanations for this behaviour, including genuine divisions within the party
over the issue of institutional anti-semitism and over the politics of Brexit. Ultimately, it con-
cludes that the most plausible explanation for MPs’ opposition to Corbyn is simply the lack of
material motivation for many of Labour’s elected representatives and officials to pursue the
end of a Labour government led by a political faction with which they themselves are not
aligned.
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WHY, EVEN FOLLOWING his dramatic suc-
cess in the 2017 general election, did so many
Labour MPs reman hostile to Jeremy Cor-
byn’s leadership of their party? Less than a
year after a majority of them had tried and
failed to remove him as Labour leader, Cor-
byn secured an outcome which almost every
member of the parliamentary Labour Party
had believed impossible under his leader-
ship. In terms of vote share alone, the 2017
result represented the most dramatic
improvement on the prior election result
achieved by any opposition party since
1945. In terms of actual parliamentary seats
gained, it was Labour’s best result for twenty
years. Labour didn’t win the election, but no
party has ever come from as bad a position as
Labour’s at the 2015 election and then gone
on to win the next one; never mind doing so
a mere two years later. And yet, the antago-
nism of a large bloc of Labour MPs towards
Corbyn subsided for no more than a couple
of months in the wake of that unexpected
upturn in Labour’s fortunes. While the hos-
tility of Labour MPs towards Corbyn during
the period 2015–7 is perhaps more easily
explicable, the persistence and even intensi-
fication of that animosity after the 2017
election raises questions about the basic
political motivations informing the behav-
iour of a range of key institutional actors
within the Labour Party, and its social and
administrative networks.
Can Labour never win from
the left?
Anti-Corbyn sentiment among MPs during
the period 2015–17 can arguably be explained
on the basis of a very widely shared assump-
tion of the time. This was the assumption that
Labour could never improve upon a prior
election result by moving politically to the
left, and that the election of radical leadership
always presaged a drastic deterioration in
Labour’s electoral position. Corbyn’s election
as leader represented the most decisive
leftward shift in the party’s history, and this
clearly alarmed MPs and others who
assumed that this could only spell electoral
disaster. To be clear, it was not merely the
impossibility of Labour winning an election
while moving to the left that was widely
assumed to be self-evident. Rather, it was
widely assumed that Labour would always
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struggle to improve its electoral position at all
while moving to the left.1
The June 2017 election result confounded
this view entirely and might, therefore, be
expected to have prompted a serious public
interrogation of some of the analytical and
strategic assumptions informing the politics
of Labour’s established mainstream and that
of its key institutions: the parliamentary party
and the party bureaucracy. We could compare
this situationwith the large-scale and dramatic
interrogation of the assumptions informing
postwar leftism that took place over the course
of the 1980s in the wake of the unexpected suc-
cess of Thatcherism.2 But it is very striking that
no examples of any such substantial intellec-
tual or organisational rethinking amongst Cor-
byn’s pre-2017 critics and opponents can be
identified. To the extent that those critics made
any analytical response at all to the 2017 elec-
tion result, there were two main types of reac-
tion, each of which sought to play down its
historic significance. One was to stress the
unique incompetence of Theresa May and her
team as political opponents. The other was to
point out that Labour was not winning votes
from the right kind of voters in the right kind
of places to be able to win a parliamentary
majority. Both arguments havemerit, and both
might have been expected to contribute to a
wider conversation about how to move on
from the surprising success of June 2017. But,
none of the people making those arguments
made any attempt to deploy them in the ser-
vice of such a conversation. Instead, they were
deployed largely as special pleading, in a per-
sistent rhetorical effort to downplay Corbyn’s
achievement and to legitimate continued
opposition to his leadership.
Any evaluation of other possible explana-
tions for this opposition must start here. Even
at the historical moment when it would have
seemed almost unavoidable, Corbyn’s critics
and factional rivals within the party made no
serious or good faith effort to engage construc-
tively with his project, to arrive at a consensual
strategy with Corbyn’s supporters, or even to
draw lessons from his success that might con-
tribute to furthering their own goals or politi-
cal agendas. This observation is not intended
as a condemnation; merely as an observation
requiring some kind of explanation. The main
actors in the story have themselves never been
willing to discuss the episode in frank terms,
but many Labour MPs and much of the party
bureaucracy did demonstrate, for four years,
an attitude toward the elected leadership that
was, at best, unenthusiastic and uncoopera-
tive. This was documented in the notorious
‘leaked report’ into the internal handling of
anti-semitism complaints commissioned in
2019 by the partyGeneral Secretary, Jenny For-
mby, the contents of which have never been
factually disputed, despite the claims by some
involved to have had their legal rights
infringed by the report’s unofficial publication
and by its lack of contextual explanation for
their behaviour.3 But, it was also self-evident
to anybody either directly involved in Labour
politics during the period, or following the
social media accounts of many Labour MPs,
that there was extraordinary antipathy and
continuous organised opposition towards
Corbyn’s leadership coming from the Labour
benches.
We must also be careful when considering
perhaps the single most obvious explanation
for MPs’ hostility to Corbyn during the 2018–
19 period: his own unpopularity with the
electorate. It is certainly true that this was a
significant issue by mid-2018, and one that
MPs hoping for re-election at a coming election
could not be expected to ignore. However, it is
also crucial to note that Corbyn’s popularity
ebbed and flowed during the period of his
leadership, and he enjoyed a brief period of
1See, for example, P. Collins ‘New times: Phillip Col-
lins on why it’s time for Labour to abolish its crisis’,
New Statesman, 22 September 2016; https://www.
newstatesman.com/politics/2016/09/new-times-
philip-collins-why-its-time-labour-abolish-its-crisis
(accessed 2 June 2021).
2S. Hall and M. Jacques, eds., New Times: The Chang-
ing Face of Politics in the 1990s, London, Lawrence
and Wishart, 1990.
3A. Perry ‘Emergency meeting on Labour’s leaked
internal report—Alice Perry’s NEC report’, Labour-
List, 24 April 2020; https://labourlist.org/2020/04/
emergency-meeting-on-labours-leaked-internal-
report-alice-perrys-nec-report/; R. Siyal ‘Labour was
warned antisemitism report was deliberately mislead-
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net popularity during the summer of 2017.
This did not prevent the press from continuing
to undermine him at every turn, and it did not
engender any significant attempts by his for-
mer critics on the Labour benches to build on
his popularity, or extend it.4 If anything, they
largely seem to have been stunned into passiv-
ity for a few short months, only to resume their
attacks on him as soon as his popularity began
to dip again.5 It hardly takes a conspiracy the-
orist, or even a partisan of Corbyn, to observe
that this is not the behaviour of political actors
who seem strongly motivated to further the
cause of their party and its leader. The ques-
tion is, what was motivating this persistent
and apparently incorrigible hostility?
The issue of anti-semitism
Insofar as explanations for this non-cooperation
have been offered since 2017, they have fre-
quently involved claims that Corbyn and/or
his leadership team and/or his factional
supporters in the party were complicit with
institutionalised anti-semitism, and that
this imposed a moral imperative of non-
cooperation on MPs. Some critics of this posi-
tion have argued that the level and frequency
of anti-semitism within the Labour Party was
always exaggerated by Corbyn’s factional ene-
mies, that some reported complaints of anti-
semitism were malicious—being motivated
more by a desire to discredit the party or cer-
tain factions with it than by any genuine con-
cern for the issue of anti-semitism—and that
in many cases a deliberate conflation was
made between anti-semitism and criticism of
Israeli policy by political actors sympathetic
to the latter, and antithetical to the organised
left. Evidence for these views is presented in
the 2018 book edited by Jamie Stern-Wiener,
Antisemitism and the Labour Party.6 But
ultimately, such claims are on their own terms
difficult to adjudicate. What is arguably less so
is the behaviour of Corbyn’s opponents once
he had agreed to accede to all of the demands
of his most stringent critics regarding the defi-
nition and prosecution of anti-semitismwithin
the Labour Party.
All of these demands had been effectively
acceded to by the end of September 2018, and
yet, throughout the year that followed Corbyn
was subject to an intensifying—not a de-
escalating—barrage of criticism from sources
that had been routinely partisan against him
since the beginning of the 2015 Labour leader-
ship campaign.7 By this time, it was being
reported by various allies of Corbyn’s inside
the party bureaucracy that hostile sections
thereof had been obstructing the efficient
investigation of complaints of anti-semitism
throughout that period. At the same time, the
proportion of members against whom com-
plaints of anti-semitism were eventually
upheld was, on the best available calculation,
0.3 per cent.8 Greg Philo and his colleagues,
in their 2019 study Bad News for Labour, found
strong evidence of online anti-semitism perpe-
trated by figures claiming allegiance to Corbyn
and the Labour Party, but found equally com-
pelling evidence that this did not in anyway rep-
resent the views of members or the branch level
experience of typical activists, and had been
magnified out of all proportion by figures—
especially prominent MPs—who were politi-
cally opposed to Corbyn and his leadership.9
None of this is to deny that any of Corbyn’s
critics had legitimate concerns. Rather, it sug-
gests that any detached observer might ques-
tion the motivations and priorities of actors in
this drama who had consistently demon-
strated their political hostility to Corbyn and
4B. Cammaerts, et al., ‘Media representations of Jer-
emyCorbyn: fromwatchdog to attack dog’, London
School of Economics and Political Science, Depart-
ment of Media and Communications, London, 2016.
5For example, L. Fisher and K. Burgess, ‘Labour




6J. Stern-Weiner, ed., Antisemitism and the Labour
Party, London, Verso, 2019.
7D. Sabbagh ‘Labour adopts IHRA antisemitism
definition in full’, The Guardian, 4 September 2018;
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/
sep/04/labour-adopts-ihra-antisemitism-
definition-in-full; Editorial, ‘The Observer view:
Labour leadership is complicit in antisemitism’,
The Observer, 14 July 2019; https://www.
theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jul/14/
observer-view-antisemitism-in-labour-jeremy-
corbyn (both accessed 2 June 2021). See alsoG. Philo,
et al., Bad News for Labour: Antisemitism, the Party and
Public Belief, London, Pluto, 2019.
8Philo, et al., Bad News for Labour, p. 52.
9Ibid.
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his supporters, prior to involving themselves
in the debate over Labour anti-semitism. They
seem to have devoted very little effort to con-
structive resolution of an institutional problem
for the Labour Party, and consistently high
levels thereof to criticising and de-legitimising
Corbyn. It therefore seems reasonable to con-
clude that the latter amounted to a higher pri-
ority for them than the former. Of course, this
observation in itself only lends credence to
the view that the desire to rid the Labour Party
of institutional anti-semitism was not, in fact,
the singular overriding priority of many of
those anti-Corbyn actors who involved them-
selves in debates and polemic over the issue.
It does not resolve the problem of what, in that
case, can be assumed to have motivated them.
The politics of Brexit
The sense that something more than moral
outrage at anti-semitism may have been at
stake in motivating such behaviours is rein-
forced by the very similar pattern of behaviour
exhibited by much the same set of actors over
an apparently unrelated set of issues. In 2016,
the justifications given by MPs for backing
Owen Smith’s challenge to Corbyn’s leader-
ship made little reference to the issue of anti-
semitism, mostly revolving around the charge
that Corbyn’s failure to lead the campaign for
a Remain votewith sufficient elan and enthusi-
asm could somehow be held responsible for
the national vote to leave the EU.
This claim was always problematic. The for-
mal Remain campaign had been led by Alan
Johnson, a former MP who has rarely been
shy—before or after, or during Corbyn’s
leadership—about expressing animosity
towards him, and by centrist Labour establish-
ment figure, Will Straw.10 The consensus
among their wing of the party before 2017
had been that Corbyn could only prove an
electoral liability. So it seems unlikely that in
early 2016 they saw him as a potential asset
which, as they would later imply, they had
been sadly frustrated by their inability to
deploy during the referendum campaign. This
issue notwithstanding, the empirical facts sim-
ply don’t support the claim that Corbyn didn’t
involve himself in the Remain campaign to a
high degree, given the amount of time that he
spent actively campaigning for it.11 It’s clear
that there were strategic disagreements
between Corbyn’s office and the rest of the
Remain campaign over such issues such as
whether, for example, Corbyn appearing
alongside Tony Blair to call for a Remain vote
would help the cause, or would only reinforce
the public sense of Remain as an establishment
project. It’s also very clear that Corbyn’s office
was correct in making the latter assumption,
given the success of the Leave campaign in
ultimately mobilising anti-establishment
sentiment.
More fundamental than any of these objec-
tions, however, is the simple fact that the suc-
cess of the Leave campaign was obviously
the consequence of decades of demographic,
cultural and political change, as well as spe-
cific, long-term, ardent campaigning by the
tabloid newspapers.12 This was an epochal
political event, but one that some analysts
might well have regarded as predictable ever
since the capture of key sections of the popular
press by right-wing authoritarian populist ide-
ologies in the 1970s.13 As such, the idea that the
outcome could be attributed to the lack of
enthusiasm or the strategic predilections
of one individual, over a short period of cam-
paigning, was always tendentious at best.
The politics of the parliamentary
Labour Party
I want to consider here two further possible
explanations for the persistent hostility of so
many Labour MPs to Corbyn’s leadership,
even in the wake of the 2017 election result.
The first, and in some senses the most obvious,
is simply that they were ideologically opposed
10For example, Press Association, ‘Jeremy Corbyn not
up to job of Labour leader, says Alan Johnson’, The




11T. Walker, ‘Brexit: clearly not Jeremy Corbyn’s
fault’, Red Pepper, 8 August 2016; https://www.
redpepper.org.uk/brexit-clearly-not-jeremy-corbyns-
fault/ (accessed 2 June 2021).
12R. Ford and M. Sobolewska, Brexitland: Identity,
Diversity and the Reshaping of British Politics, Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press, 2020.
13A. Barnett, The Lure of Greatness: England’s Great-
ness and America’s Trump, London, Unbound, 2017.
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to Corbyn’s political and programmatic aims,
believingthatanyattempt tocarryoutsuchapro-
gramme could only end in disaster. This might
seem like a very simple proposition, and in some
cases itwouldbe.Throughout itshistory,asignif-
icant section of the Labour Party’s constituent
institutions have had no meaningful commit-
ment to progressive social reform beyond the
bare minimum necessary to differentiate a
Labour government from a Conservative one,
and this has always applied to at least a notable
portion of the parliamentary party.
But what does it actually mean to have
members of a nominally democratic socialist
party who are in fact opposed to anything
resembling a recognisable democratic socialist
(or even social democratic) programme? It is
important to differentiate at least two possible
understandings of such ‘opposition’ here. One
would be the most obvious: the politicians in
question simply being opposed to any signifi-
cant regulation or inhibition of capitalist inter-
ests in the pursuit of collective goods; such
opposition springing either from personal
ideological conviction, or from a determina-
tion to serve corporate and commercial inter-
ests under all possible circumstances.
But another meaning of ‘opposition’ might
relate to the question of what particular actors
regard as politically feasible, as opposed towhat
they regard as ultimately desirable. This is cer-
tainlyanimportantdistinctionforunderstanding
the subjective, conscious motivations of such
actors, as at least two pieces of evidence suggest.
One would be the polling of Labour MPs that
seems to showgeneral support for a set of policy
priorities and preferences—or at least for a set of
‘economicvalues’—thatwould, if carried to their
logical conclusion, amount to a fairly substantial
social democratic reform programme.14 The
other piece of evidence I can offer is, unfortu-
nately, anecdotal—if nonetheless fairly authori-
tative: several Labour MPs of many years
standing, including both past and present Cabi-
net and ShadowCabinetmembers, have person-
ally described tome the difference betweenwhat
they see as an authentically ‘Blairite’ minority
within the parliamentary Labour Party, who
would not regard the implementation of a social
democratic programme as desirable, however
feasible itmight be; and a ‘Brownite’ or ‘soft left’
majority who would not have understood their
opposition to a programme such as Corbyn’s in
suchterms,butintermsofitscompleteunfeasibil-
ity under present social, political and economic
conditions.
In practice, it is academic which of these per-
spectives a given individual holds, if there is no
likely circumstance under which someone hold-
ing the second perspective could be induced to
change their view as to what might currently be
politically feasible.Assuch,wecanarguablysitu-
ate most serving LabourMPs on a continuum of
opinion that includeseachof thesepositions.This
is understandable from a cultural and historical
perspective. Almost any current Labour MP
grewupinapoliticalandculturalclimatedefined
by the widespread assumption that there was
simply no future for anything resembling the
left-wing politics of the twentieth century,
whether in its reformist or revolutionary forms.
The historic defeats of both Soviet communism
and British and American social democracy in
the 1980s were understood as irreversible, with
any attempt to return to their methods and pro-
grammes being seen as misguided. Many
assumed that the only possible outcome of such
a return to ‘traditional’ socialism on the part of
organisations, such as the Labour Party, could
be either certain electoral defeat, or even an ata-
vistic resurgence of popular authoritarianism.15
At the same time, perhapsmore problematically,
the legacy of the New Left—that had defined
itself against bothSoviet state socialismandpost-
war bureaucratic paternalism—was largely
derided, dismissed, or ignored during this
period. It’s notablehere thatmanyof the thinkers
whowere responsible for creating this climate of
opinion in the 1980s and 1990s—the formative
period for most people who are likely to have
been MPs during 2015–20—have long since
recanted those views, even while their personal
influence on public discourse has waned.16 But,
14T. Bale, et al.,Mind the Values Gap: The Social and Eco-
nomic Values of MPs, Party Members and Voters,
London, The UK in a Changing Europe, 2020;
https://ukandeu.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/
06/Mind-the-values-gap.pdf (accessed 2 June 2021).
15A. Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal of Social
Democracy, Cambridge, Polity, 1998; G. Mulgan,
ed., Life After Politics: New Ideas for the Twenty-First
Century, London, Fontana, 1997.
16For example, compare Charles Leadbeater’s
paeans to liberal individualism in his two contribu-
tions to Hall and Jacques, New Times, ‘Power to the
person’ and ‘Thatcherism and progress’—with his
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it’s their positions of the 1980s and 1990s—or at
least, those positions as understood byparticular
social and institutional networks—that have
shaped theworldviewandpolitical assumptions
of many of today’s professional politicians and
their closest media allies. In particular, this
applies to the networks of technocrats,managers
and policy specialists who formed Labour’s pre-
ferred pool from which to draw parliamentary
candidates throughout the period 1994–2015.17
To the extent that suchMPs remainwedded to
these views—consciously or unconsciously, and
for whatever reason—it would be logical for
them to refuse cooperation with Corbyn and his
supporters even after the June 2017 election. But
it is also clear that these views are not shared by
a majority of Labour members, nor by a large
number of Labour supporters—including, pre-
sumably,manyof the over-10millionwhovoted
Labour in 2017. This leaves us with, at the very
least, serious questions to consider regarding the
health of a democratic system wherein such a
large constituency can go effectively unrepre-
sented, while the representatives that they elect
remain unwilling to express openly their dis-
agreements with them. Again, it is important to
stress here that, while prominent retired figures
suchasPeterMandelsonhaveopenlydenounced
Corbyn and his supporters on purely political/
ideological grounds, almost no sitting Labour
MPs were willing to give voice to a clearly-
expressedpolitical critiqueofCorbynorCorbyn-
ismduring the entire period of his leadership.
The defence of institutional
interests
The foregoing argument has addressed the pre-
mise that Labour MPs’ lack of cooperation with
Corbynmighthaveproceeded fromsimple ideo-
logical disagreement with his programme. But,
any such explanation for their behaviour, as we
have seen, ultimately rests on some fairly com-
plex and necessarily tendentious assumptions
regarding the nature of MPs’ political beliefs
and ideologies. This is potentially problematic—
for no other reason than that it assumes MPs to
hold consistent, coherent and clearly articulable
beliefs. This itselfmaybeamistakenassumption,
given the consistent evidence generated by pse-
phologists as to the relatively piecemeal and con-
tradictory nature of the political beliefs held by
most individual citizens. But, there is one rather
simpler explanation available for such opposi-
tion, that I think must be taken very seriously.
This is that manyMPs perceived the rise of both
Corbyn and the movement associated with him
as a major threat to their institutional privileges,
and those of their closest political allies.
In the early days of Corbyn’s leadership, and
especially in the wake of the failed attempt by
MPs to depose him in 2016, there was a constant
stream of media speculation as to the likelihood
of right-wing MPs being subject to de-selection
by their local parties, which never really died
downuntil the run-up to the 2019 election.Given
that almost no attempts were made to organise
the local ‘trigger ballots’ that would have initi-
ated re-selection processes within local constitu-
ency parties, it seems safe to suggest that this
issue was always something of a ‘red herring’.
Arguably more important was the perceived
threat to their roles—and, in some cases,
livelihoods—on the part of Labour’s regional
and national officials, and its network of many
thousands of local councillors. It is important to
understand here that in constituencies repre-
sented by a LabourMP, the localMP’s officewill
typically act as an informal communication and
organisation hub for networks of party officers,
officials and local councillors, andwill often play
an unofficial role in enabling political factions
sympathetic to the MP to organise against their
internal opponents.
There are twomajor organisations thatplayan
explicitly factional role on the right wing of the
Labour Party: Progress and Labour First.18 It is
notable—and crucial for understanding the poli-
ticsof theLabourParty inrecentyears—tounder-
stand that the very existence of these
organisations, while not a secret, has never been
extensively reported on by any of the keymedia
advocacy of democratic, networked collectivism in
C. Leadbeater, We-Think: Mass innovation not Mass
Production, London, Profile Books, 2009.
17P. Allen, The Political Class: Why it Maters Who
Our Politicians Are, Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2018.
18H. Pemberton and M. Wickham-Jones, ‘Factional-
ism in the parliamentary Labour Party and the 2015
leadership contest’, Renewal: A Journal of Social
Democracy, vol. 23, no. 3, 2015, pp. 5–21; ‘Factions:
Is Labour a broad church?’, Apple Podcasts, n.d.;
https://podcasts.apple.com/ga/podcast/factions-
is-labour-a-broad-church/id1125000940?i=
1000375553519 (accessed 3 June 2021).
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sources that are regularly read or consumed by
typical partymembers, namely the BBC and The
Guardian. The failure of the mainstream press
and broadcast media to report accurately on
Labour’s internal politics is exemplified by their
treatment of Labour First. This is one of the lon-
gest surviving internal factional organisations in
the party’s history, and also one of the most
aggressively and explicitly sectarian, having no
clearly defined purpose other than to prevent
the organised left from gaining influence within
the party. It is also routinely successful in
influencing local and constituency level candi-
date selections, as well as elections to the party’s
National Executive Committee:
the organisation’s key organiser and spokesper-
son,LukeAkehurst,beingacurrentelectedmem-
ber of that body. And yet, its very existence has
rarelybeenacknowledgedby, for example, polit-
ical reporters for The Guardian or the BBC, never
mind its influence and operations being actively
investigated and reported on.
Local factional organising efforts do not nor-
mally advertise their affiliation to either of
these organisations, or make any explicit refer-
ence to their existence. For example, attempts
to organise right-wing ‘slates’ of candidates
for elected positions within local and constitu-
ency parties will often be made by party mem-
bers with direct links to these organisations,
but those efforts will almost invariably present
themselves to casual party members as being
conducted by non-aligned groups of local
‘moderates’, rather than as allies or members
of organised intra-party factions. Nonetheless,
there can be no doubt that these organised net-
works and organisations have played a crucial
role in determining the political composition
of the parliamentary Labour Party and the
large population of Labour local councillors
in the UK, for several decades. A key objective
of both Labour First and Progress throughout
their respective histories has been to influence
the selection of parliamentary candidates and
candidates for local elections, and they would
not have persisted for so long had they not
enjoyed some success in achieving these aims.
Importantly, ProgressandLabourFirst hadno
significant rivals for factional dominance within
the party—apart from each other—for many
yearsprior to the launchof thepro-Corbynmem-
bership organisation, Momentum, in 2015. As
such, it is easy to see why the very existence of
Momentum—as a much larger and more
dynamicorganisation,allieddirectly toapopular
leader—posed a serious threat to the personal
and collective interests of key networks of politi-
cal actors who had not been subject to any such
seriousthreatsincethe1980s.Thissurelyexplains
the quite extraordinary levels of invective
directed at the organisation throughout its his-
tory, by MPs and their factional allies within the
party, despite the fact that its only significant
activity throughout that time was to mobilise
partymembers to canvass for Labour candidates
duringthe2017and2019elections,withconsider-
able success.
This also goes a long way towards explain-
ing the ongoing and apparently unappeasable
hostility of Labour MPs to Corbyn’s leader-
ship, even after the historic success of the June
2017 election.Many of theseMPs belong to for-
mal and informal networks of mutual support,
whose main function is to ensure that control
of key party posts (elected and appointed)
remains in the hands of those networks and
their members. The existence of Corbynism
as an organised movement and, in particular,
the demonstrable organising capacity of
Momentum, posed an immediate threat to
the ability of those networks to retain control
of those posts. As such, it presented a material
threat to the social status and income of many
members of those networks, irrespective of
any ideological differences they may or not
have had with Corbyn and his supporters.
It is important to grasp here that the personal
material circumstances of most Labour MPs,
full-time officials and local councillors are such
as to classify them as among the most affluent
third of the UK population. As such, they do
not belong to those social groups who would
have the most to gain from a radical change
of direction to the essential priorities of the
UK government, or among those who have
lost out from forty years of persistent neolib-
eral hegemony. So, there is nothing irrational
about them pursuing courses of action that
prioritise the maintenance of their localised
institutional privileges over the objective of
securing a Labour government—especially if
that government is likely to pursue a radical
break with the previous four decades of policy
consensus. To this extent, the onus of proof
must be on any commentator or analyst who
claims that such a calculation of interests has
not motivated the fiercest opponents of Cor-
bynism within the Labour Party since 2015.
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Ofall theexplanationsforMPs’behaviourdur-
ing the period 2017–19 that we have considered,
this seems to be the simplest, the most robust,
and yet the one that has received the least atten-
tion from political commentators. The MPs in
question belong to social and professional net-
works made up of individuals who simply have
no personal interest in seeing a Labour govern-
ment elected, under circumstances suchas aCor-
byn leadership. Labour remaining in opposition
indefinitelywouldpose littledirect threat to their
livelihoods, lifestyles or social status. By contrast,
thefinal success of theCorbynproject in securing
an election win might well have proven
extremely damaging to them, especially if it had
led to large-scale substitution of local councillors
and party officials by pro-Corbyn replacements.
Commentators and analysts who insist that the
primary motivations of such actors are princi-
pled, ‘values-based’ and ideological will object
to this interpretation of events. As I have sug-
gested, however, given all the facts, the onus of
proof is on them. It is up to them, I think, to dem-
onstrate that a simple calculation of material
interests—conscious or unconscious—did not
play the role that I am positing, in driving the
behaviour of Labour’s organised right-wing,
andthe largenumberofLabourMPswhoare for-
mally or informally connected with it, between
2015 and 2020.
The legacies of New Labour
Lewis Minkin, in his classic study of Blairism,
demonstrates clearly how the New Labour pro-
ject was dependent upon a ruthless and quite
unprecedentedprojectonthepartofasmallpolit-
ical faction to takecontrolof thepartymachinery,
its networks of officials, its decision making and
executive bodies, and its processes of candidate
selection.19 In effect,Minkin shows that theNew
Labour project effectively did away with any
notion of ‘The Labour Party’ as an institution to
which all internal actors should demonstrate a
loyalty higher than that which they might owe
to any particular political tendency or sectarian
grouping. In 2015, the majority of Labour MPs,
councillors and full-time officials were individ-
uals who had come into office under the aegis of
thatagenda:between2010and2015,EdMiliband
had made little attempt, and had even less suc-
cess, at replacing the New Labour network with
onemore in linewith the politics of his own ‘soft
left’ support base. As such, their behaviour was
entirely understandable. This was a generation
of political professionalswho, inmost cases since
thebeginningof their careers,hadbeensocialised
into a specific conception of politics, consistent
with the key organising ideas of New Labour.
According to this conception, the role of the
Labour politician is to represent the interests of
their constituents by advocating for ameliorative
reforms to the way in which neoliberal policy is
administered, and to the way in which capitalist
interests are furthered. But it is never to advocate
for policies or political strategies thatwould con-
stitute any serious departure from neoliberal
norms, or threaten to limit or reduce the power
and influence of corporate institutions to any sig-
nificant extent. This is not, in any meaningful
sense, apoliticsof reform: it is apoliticsof compli-
ance. From the perspective of such a politics, any
attempt to revive a genuinely reforming political
programme—however moderate—is by defini-
tion illegitimate; such that anyorganisational tac-
tics and any form of propaganda required to
delegitimate or defeat it can be considered
justifiable.
Of course, as we have already mentioned,
this is not a view shared by most Labour Party
members or supporters, and it is not one that is
ever publicly advertised or explicitly acknowl-
edged by its adherents (apart from occasional
outliers such as Peter Mandelson). The gap
between the reforming aspirations of large
section of the electorate, and the working
assumptions informing the behaviour of many
of their supposed political representatives, is
surely a phenomenon worthy of note. This
may not be surprising to anyonewho has stud-
ied Labour Party politics thoroughly over the
past few decades. But, it is striking to note that
this state of affairs simply does constitute an
everyday point of reference for mainstream
journalistic and political discourse in the UK,
which makes any effective remedy, for the
foreseeable future, sadly difficult to envisage
After Corbyn
Can theLabourPartyovercome the impassepro-
duced by this fundamental conflict between its
base, its members and its key institutions, and
the failure of public media institutions even to
19L. Minkin, The Blair Supremacy: A Study in the Poli-
tics of the Labour Party’s Management, Manchester,
Manchester University Press, 2014.
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report accurately on its affairs? It seems unlikely
under present circumstances. The managerialist
politics to which Labour’s right wing remains
committed is not only out of tune with the vast
majority of members and supporters: it seems
increasingly dated and ineffectual in a world of
instantcommunication,peer-to-peerinformation
flowsandconstant online interaction. Since 2016,
the Conservative Party has moved decisively
towards a nationalist populist programme, but
under Keir Starmer’s leadership, Labour has
embracedastrategythatwasformulatedatatime
when the characteristic features of Tory ideology
were still the austerity economics of George
Osborne and the elite, socially liberal cosmopoli-
tanism of David Cameron.20 Neither Starmer’s
embrace of social conservatism and symbolic jin-
goism,northesackingof left-wingfrontbenchers,
nor the ritual humiliation of Corbyn himself, nor
the campaign of suspensions of Corbynite
membersand localpartiesengaged inbyGeneral
Secretary, David Evans, since 2020, seem to have
done anything to improve Labour’s polling
performance over the past year. Given the analy-
sis above,wemight assume that theywere never
really intendedtoachieveanysuchoutcome;and
that the demoralisation and disempowerment of
the Labour left has been pursued as an end in
itself.
How long will the people whom Labour is
supposed to represent, and above all the party’s
own members, put up with this? Perhaps, once
the pandemic ends, Boris Johnson’s popular-
ity will fade and nobody will be asking that
question. If not, then the answer may be:
‘not very long at all’.
Jeremy Gilbert is Professor of Cultural and
Political Theory at the University of East
London.
20Starmer’s head of policy, Clare Ainsley, published
her book The New Working Class: how to Win Hearts,
Minds and Votes in 2018, but its arguments were
effectively a re-hash and rationalisation for the ‘Blue
Labour’ position that had been defined by figures
such as Maurice Glasman during the period of Ed
Miliband’s tenure as Labour leader, 2010-5
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